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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The creation of an effective taxation system appears to be one of the
most challenging problems for economies in transition. Budget-financed
activities, such as social welfare, health care, fundamental science, etc.,
essentially depend on the existence of a carefully-designed taxation
system. Unfortunately, tax evasion is widespread in Russia. The State
Tax Service of Russia, through its collection and auditing efforts, makes
an essential contribution to raising tax revenue. However, there is some
statistical evidence that there exists significant potential to increase tax
revenues, in particular by creating a more efficient taxation system.
Some experts estimate that the "grey economy", in which no taxes are
paid, amounts to 40% of Russian GDP.
Another serious problem is caused by the extremely low salary of tax in-
spectors. Receiving about $100 per month, some inspectors would
seem to have strong incentives to engage in corrupt activities. The offi-
cial statistics do not show any significant corruption in fiscal bodies, but
there does exist a widespread opinion that the level of corruption within
fiscal agencies is relatively substantial.
The present report considers several game-theory models related to tax
evasion and the organization of audits for individual taxpayers and small
enterprises. The first type of models studies the interaction between the
tax authority and a group of taxpayers whose income is random, without
taking into account the possibility of corruption. It is assumed that, at
the end of the accounting period, each taxpayer declares her/his in-
come to the tax inspectorate. The reported income is taxed according to
the given tax rates, although a taxpayer may try to evade taxation by
under-reporting. Recognising this possibility, the tax inspectorate audits
some taxpayers. A detected tax evader is made to pay the evaded tax
as well as a fine. Further, it is assumed that auditing is costly and that
the central authority is interested in maximising net tax revenue (all the
money received from taxes and fines minus audit expenditures) given
the prevailing tax rates, fines and the costs of auditing. In the case of a
homogeneous group of taxpayers, the only taxpayer-specific information
available to the tax authority is declared incomes. Thus, the authority
bases its choice of the probability of auditing on reported incomes. The
purpose of this model is to find the optimal auditing rule given the tax
rates and the income distribution.
The second part of the study is devoted to a model that takes the pos-
sibility of corruption into account. Tax inspectors are considered as an-
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other group of strategic players, in addition to the central tax authority
and the taxpayers. There are two possible levels of income. The model
assumes that a tax inspector who has discovered an instance of tax
evasion may bargain with the detected evader over the amount of a
bribe given in exchange for not revealing the evasion. In order to pre-
vent this kind of corruption, the authority analyses the reports of in-
spectors, chooses to review some of the audits and penalises those in-
spectors who have not reported what the authority determined, in the
review, to be instances of tax evasion. Thus, the authority’s problem is
to choose the frequencies with which to audit, at two levels — the audit
of taxpayers by inspectors and the review of audits by the centre — de-
pending on the information received. The first purpose of the analysis is
to determine the optimal strategy for a tax authority that maximises net
tax revenue given the tax rates, the penalties for evasion and for im-
proper auditing, and the costs of audit and review. Another purpose is
to provide a comparative statics analysis of net tax revenues with re-
spect to the fine and tax rates both under optimal, as well as under
constant non-optimal, probabilities of audit and review.
Our main practical conclusions are as follows.
1. The existing practical method of audit organisation is similar to the
deterministic cut-off rule: taxpayers should be classified into groups
with the same distribution of random income, and then every tax-
payer with declared income less than some threshold specific for
each group is audited. However, our analysis shows that this ap-
proach is not effective and should be replaced by the probabilistic
cut-off rule: suspicious taxpayers should be audited with such mini-
mal probability that makes tax evasion unprofitable. For any propor-
tional tax and fine system, and for risk-neutral taxpayers, this prob-
ability is determined by the ratio of the tax and fine rates. Under the
current rates of profit tax in Russia, this probability is about 0.15.
Employment of a probabilistic cut-off rule either reduces the number
of necessary audits or increases the set of enterprises that may be
audited. This method may essentially increase net tax revenue.
2. The auditing strategy needs adjustment for corrupt inspectors in or-
der to avoid the bribery of inspectors by taxpayers. We study two
possibilities for such modification. One is to review the results of all
audits and to penalise inspectors if the review reveals that the in-
spector has concealed tax evasion. The other way is to increase the
auditing probability to such an extent that evasion is unprofitable,
even if it is possible to bribe an inspector. Which method is less ex-
pensive depends on the relationship between different parameters.
For instance, if the fine for evasion is sufficiently high, or a typical
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bribe is close to the maximum value acceptable for an evader, then
the second variant looks more preferable. If the fine is relatively
small, or the bribe is close to the minimum acceptable to an inspec-
tor, then the first variant is favourable.
3. It is necessary to adjust the auditing strategy (the probabilities of
audit and review) for every change in the tax rate or the penalty for
evasion. Otherwise, an increase in these values may create new in-
centives for tax evasion or dishonest auditing and imply a decline in
tax revenue.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of an effective taxation system appears to be one of the
most challenging problems for economies in transition and particularly
for Russia where tax evasion is widespread. Some experts estimate the
"grey economy", in which no taxes are paid, as amounting to 40% of
Russian GDP.
Corruption among tax inspectors represents another serious problem.
The official data do not show any significant corruption in fiscal bodies
(in particular, in 1995 there were 100 criminal investigations into bribery
and only 6 inspectors were brought to trial), but there exists a wide-
spread perception that the level of corruption within fiscal bodies is
relatively substantial (see, for example, the interview of Hakamada in
"Delovie lyudi", No.2, 1998). One possible factor that contributes to
corruption among tax inspectors may be their relatively low salaries. Re-
ceiving about $100 per month, some inspectors would seem to have
strong incentives to become corrupt.
The present paper develops several game-theory models related to tax
evasion and corruption in the tax inspectorate. The first type of models
studies the interaction between the tax authority and a group of taxpay-
ers whose income is random, without taking into account the possibility
of corruption. It is assumed that, at the end of the accounting period,
each taxpayer declares his/her income to the tax inspectors. The re-
ported income is taxed according to the given tax rates. However, a
taxpayer may try to hide some part of income by under-reporting. If the
taxpayer is audited, the inspector will inevitably uncover the true level of
income. The detected tax evader is fined and made to pay the evaded
tax. Further, it is assumed that auditing is costly and that the central
authority is interested in maximising net tax revenue (i.e. the sum of
taxes and penalties minus expenditures on audits) given the tax rates,
fines and the costs of auditing. In the case of a homogeneous group of
taxpayers, the only taxpayer-specific information available to the tax
authority is the declared incomes. Thus, the authority must determine
the probability of audit, using these declarations. The purpose of this
model is to find the optimal auditing rule given the tax rates and income
distribution. Section 3.1.1 discusses the solution to this problem with
risk-neutral taxpayers when the fine for evasion is proportional to the
evaded tax. Section 3.1.2 considers a similar problem with a progressive
tax system and a fine for evasion proportional to the hidden income.
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The second part of the study is devoted to a model that takes the pos-
sibility of corruption into account. Tax inspectors are modelled as an-
other group of strategic players, in addition to the central tax authority
and the taxpayers. Taxpayers can have two possible levels of income.
The model assumes that a tax inspector who has discovered an instance
of tax evasion may bargain with the detected evader over the size of a
bribe given in exchange for not revealing the evasion. In order to pre-
vent this kind of corruption, the authority analyses the reports of in-
spectors, chooses to review some of the inspector’s audits and penal-
ises those inspectors who have not reported tax evasion. Thus, the
authority’s problem is to choose the frequencies of both levels of
audit — the audit of taxpayers by inspectors and the review of audits
from the centre — depending on the information received.
The first purpose of the analysis is to determine the optimal strategy for
the authority which maximises net tax revenue given the tax rates, the
penalties for evasion and poor auditing, and the costs of audit and re-
view. Another goal is to determine the comparative statics of net tax
revenue with respect to financial penalties and tax rates, both under op-
timal audit and review conditions, and under given non-optimal prob-
abilities. Section 3.2 solves this problem and shows that net tax revenue
never decreases in the specified rates under the optimal rules, while it
may decrease with fixed probabilities of auditing and reviewing.
Finally, Section 4 contains some implications of the results and dis-
cusses their application to the Russian economy. Proofs of Theorems
are provided in an Appendix.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Tax evasion is a problem even in countries with developed tax systems.
It has been analysed extensively within the economics literature. The
connection between tax evasion and corruption has also been examined
in a number of articles (see, for example, (Chander, Wilde, 1992; Ñîêî-
ëîâñêèé, 1989; Âàñèí, Àãàïîâà, 1993b)).
Several studies (Srinivasan, 1973; Cowell, Gordon, 1995) consider total
tax revenue in situations where evasion is possible, but without taking
corruption into account. A basic result on the optimal auditing of direct
taxes appears in (Sanchez, Sobel, 1993). They consider a population of
taxpayers with a random income distribution, characterised by a positive
density over the given interval [l, h]. For any income I, the required tax is
determined by a tax schedule T(I) established by the government. The
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tax strictly increases in I. The interaction between taxpayers and the tax
administration follows the same procedure as described in the above
introduction. The administration sets a probability p(I) of auditing, de-
pending on reported income I.
If an audit reveals under-reporting, the penalty imposed on the taxpayer
is proportional to the unpaid tax with the coefficient of proportionality
1 + π > 1 (since the penalty includes the unpaid tax).
If the tax administration aims to maximise the revenue from taxes and
fines net of auditing costs, Sanchez and Sobel (1993) show that the
optimal auditing policy always belongs to the class of cut-off rules:


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= π+
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,
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for some I ∈ [l, h]. Thus, every reported income I < I is audited with
probability 1/(1+π), which is the minimum probability which makes it un-
profitable to report I for any taxpayer with income I' > I. Section 3.1 be-
low generalises this result by considering arbitrary distributions of in-
come.
Cowell and Gordon (1995) compare different audit strategies available
to a tax authority that collects indirect taxes. The authors model tax eva-
sion as follows: taxpayers choose between taxable activities on the
regular market and unreported activities on an informal market. Indi-
viduals are audited and, where they are found to be undertaking irregu-
lar activities, are fined and made to repay the evaded tax. One possible
strategy is to audit randomly, with some fixed probability that any tax-
payer is investigated.
An alternative policy is to take into account what the authority knows
about each taxpayer. Cowell and Gordon study a simple form of this ap-
proach where the authority conditions the probability of audit on re-
ported turnover via a cut-off rule: those reporting less (no less) than a
certain amount are always (never) audited. Cowell and Gordon establish
conditions under which the optimal random audit is better than the op-
timal cut-off rule, and vice versa. However, as Siniscalco notes in his
discussion of Cowell and Gordon’s model (Cowell and Gordon, 1995,
p.197), the optimal audit strategy in general does not belong to any of
the specified classes.
Chander and Wilde (1992), in "Corruption in tax administration" (here-
after the CW model), focus on the interaction between taxpayers and
tax inspectors (i.e. auditors), taking into account the possibility of cor-
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ruption. According to this model, a taxpayer can have either high or low
income with some probability and is expected to pay taxes correspond-
ing to actual income. Nevertheless, a taxpayer who earns high income
may under-report, claiming low income. If that taxpayer is audited, any
tax evasion is detected, with certainty, by the tax inspector. It is possi-
ble, however, that the inspector can be bribed to conceal the results of
the audit. In this case, the taxpayer is free from both taxation (of high
income) and the penalty for tax evasion, but there exists a chance that
the inspector and evader will be caught, in which case both suffer addi-
tional costs.
The players (i.e. taxpayers and auditors) are assumed to be risk neutral.
Taxpayers minimise their expected total expenditures on taxes, bribes
and the penalties (for tax evasion and bribery) applied when their non-
compliance is detected. Tax inspectors maximise their expected net
gains (that is, their expected income from bribes minus penalties for ex-
posed bribe-taking). A strategy of a taxpayer includes a probability of
engaging in tax evasion and the decision of whether or not to bribe the
tax inspector if evasion is detected. A strategy of an inspector concerns
whether or not to take a bribe. A strategy of reviewing audits by the
central tax agency is chosen to maximise net tax revenue. The strate-
gies of all agents are assumed to form a Nash equilibrium. Under these
assumptions, the paper studies comparative statics and obtains complex
and ambiguous results: sometimes an increase in the tax rate may de-
crease net tax revenues.
In the present report, we investigate comparative statics with respect to
the rates of financial penalties. There are several important differences
between the CW analysis and our approach. The CW model assumes
that the probability of auditing is determined by the Nash equilibrium
strategies of the players, while the probability of bribery exposure is
fixed. However, both these values in practice may be controlled by the
central authority.
In common with Cowell and Gordon, we assume that the strategy of the
tax authority (including the rules for audit and review and the penalties
for violations) is common knowledge. The behaviour of taxpayers and
inspectors is rational in the following sense. Everyone is an expected
utility-maximiser, risk-neutral with respect to income after tax and fines.
We assume that, if the minimum bribe value acceptable for an inspector
is less than the maximum size of a bribe that is acceptable to a tax-
payer, then they come to an agreement that shares the surplus in some
proportion. As the acceptable sizes of bribes depend on tax and penalty
rates, taxpayers and inspectors determine their strategies depending on
the parameters chosen by the central authority.
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So, in common with Cowell and Gordon, and in contrast to the CW
model, we determine the strategy of the tax authority within a principal-
agent framework. Another difference with the CW model is that we con-
sider optimal auditing rules (as opposed to fixed audit probabilities)
when studying the comparative statics of net tax revenue with respect to
the fine and tax rates. This seems to be reasonable since the auditing
rules are more flexible than the rates established by the legislature.
Section 3.2 shows that, under our approach, we obtain clear and trac-
table results, avoiding some of the ambiguous findings of the CW
model.
Obviously, the maximisation of tax revenue is not the only goal of eco-
nomic regulation. Optimal income redistribution through taxation pres-
ents a related problem that is widely discussed in the literature (see
Piketti, 1992; Ìîâøîâè÷, Áîãäàíîâà, Êðóïåíèíà, 1997, etc.). We do
not consider the redistribution motive for taxation in our model. Note,
however, that the optimal tax rates that emerge from a more general
maximisation problem may be viewed as defining the desirable tax rates
that are the exogenous parameters of our model.
3. THE MODELS
3.1. A model without corruption
Consider a homogeneous group of taxpayers with distribution of income
I given by density ν(I), I ≥ 0. Let T(I) denote the legal tax liability for in-
come I. The behaviour of taxpayers is characterised by the function
Id(I), which determines the declared value of income Id depending on
actual income I. The tax authority establishes the probability p(Id) of
audit for those who declare income Id. An audit always reveals the tax-
payer’s true income. The fine for cheating is given by the function
F(I, Id), and includes the unpaid tax.
The optimal strategy of a taxpayer for any given p(⋅) is determined by
the solution to the problem:
Id(I, p(⋅)) → max {(I – T(Id) – p(Id))F(I, Id)}, Id ∈ [0, I].
Let c denote the cost of one audit. Then, for any p(⋅), the net tax reve-
nue of the central authority is:
)(})))(,(,(())(,(())(,(({))(( IdcpIIIFpIIppIITpR ddd ν−⋅⋅+⋅=⋅ ∫ .
and the authority’s problem is to find the strategy p∗(⋅) which maximises
this value.
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3.1.1. The case of a proportional tax and fine structure. Let
T(Id) = t Id,    F(I, Id) = (f + t)(I – Id),
where t and f are positive scalars. The following proposition determines
the minimum probability of being audited which guarantees that a tax-
payer with income I will declare the true level of income.
Proposi t ion 1.  Id(I, p(⋅)) = I if p(Id) ≥ t/(f + t) for any Id < I.
Thus, if a taxpayer’s income is a priori unbounded, then the optimal
audit strategy among those which reveal the true income of every tax-
payer is a random audit with probability
ft
t
p
+
≡
?
.
However, this strategy is generally sub-optimal if income is a priori
bounded.
For any I consider the following cut-off rule: pIIp
?
=),(  if II < , and
0),( =IIp  otherwise. Under this rule, any taxpayer with income II <
declares I, and everyone with income II >  declares I . Note that this
rule is clearly optimal if all taxpayers have incomeI. There exist many
other rules corresponding to different non-increasing probabilities p(Id),
which we cannot a priori reject as sub-optimal. The following Theorem
shows that the optimal rule, however, always belongs to the class of
cut-off rules (including the random rule p
?
 as the limiting case). Let
ρ=dIdv /  be the density of income.
Theorem. The strategy p(Id) = t/(t + f) for any Id  is optimal if
∫
≥
≥ρ
+
−−
II
dII
tf
ct
IIt 0)())((    for any I ; (1)
otherwise, the cut-off rule with some I  such that (1) fails is the optimal
one. Proof of this Theorem and sequenced propositions are given in the
Appendix.
Let us discuss condition (1). This condition is met with equality if ρ(I) =
k⋅exp(–I(t + f)/c), and it holds as an inequality if |ρ′/ρ| < (f + t)/c for
I > I  (that is, for distributions of income with a "heavy tail").
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If (1) fails to hold, then the problem is: to find I  that maximises
R(p(⋅| I )) ≡ def R( I ). This function is multi-extreme in the general case.
However, for a wide class of distributions the optimal value is unique.
Proposi t ion 2. Let ρ have a unique maximum IM, and let |ρ′/ρ| in-
crease in I when ],[ III M
?
∈  and decrease in I when II
?
> . Then )(IR
?
has, at most, two local maxima including +∞.
Note that the lognormal distribution with




σ
−
πσ
=ρ
2
2
2
)/(ln
exp
2
1
)(
II
I
I
meets the conditions of Proposition 2 (in this case 2lnln σ−= IIM ,
,lnln 2σ+= II
?
and two optima are possible).
Now, let us show that any increasing continuous tax T(I) and any penalty
proportional to the unpaid tax (F(I, Id) = (1 + π)(T(I) – T(Id)) is equivalent
to the linear case that has already been examined. Indeed, let
dT(I)/dI+ = t(I) > 0. We can rewrite the problems for a taxpayer and the
authority as follows:
{ }))(1)((min)( ddd TTTpTTT d −π++→ ,
{ }∫ µ−−π++→⋅ ),(]))(1))[((()(max)( ddd TdcTTTTpTTp
where µ(T) = ν(I(T)) for I(T) such that T(I(T)) = T. If ν(I) is differentiable
at I(T) then
dI
TId
ItdT
Td ))((
)(
1)( ν
=
µ
.
a b c
Figure. Different variants of the relationship between R and I : a — two maxima;
b, c — unique maximum.
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3.1.2. Progressive tax and fine linearly depending on non-dec-
lared income. Now, let us assume that the tax is progressive and that
the fine linearly depends on non-declared income. (This is currently the
case in Russian legislation.) That is, let T(I) be a monotone convex func-
tion such that T(0) = 0 , dT/dI+ = def t(I) does not decrease and equals
to tmax  for sufficiently large I, and F(I, Id) = T(I) – T(Id) + f(I – Id). The
counterpart  of Proposition 1 in this case is as follows.
Proposi t ion 3. Id(I)=I if p(Id)≥ p
?
(Id, I)=def(T(I)–T(Id))/(T(I)–T(Id)+f(I–Id))
for any Id < I.
Proceeding from this result, the optimal audit strategy among those
which reveal the true income of every taxpayer is random auditing with a
probability p
?
= tmax/(tmax + f). However, the "competitors" of this strat-
egy are more complicated than the cut-off rules considered for a pro-
portional tax. For a progressive tax, any rule p(Id, I ) with t = tmax is
dominated by the following audit strategy:
),()|( IIpIIp dd
?
= , if IId < ; else 0)|( =IIp d .
That is, lower declared incomes can be audited with probability less
than p
?
. Moreover, sometimes the strategy )|( Ip ⋅  is dominated by an-
other:
),()|(~ IIpIIp dd
?
= , if IId < , else ),0()|(~ IpIIp d
?
= ,
which differs from the previous strategy where high incomes are audited
with the same probability as an income declaration of 0.
Conjecture. The optimal audit rule for progressive tax is either
)|( Ip ⋅ or )|(~ Ip ⋅  for some I , 0 ≤ I  ≤ ∞.
If the conjecture is true, then the problem of the optimal audit strategy
search is reduced to the following: to find I  which maximises
( )
( ) .)()(),0(,)()(max
)(),()()(
0






ρ−+ρ+
+ρ−=
∫ ∫
∫
I I
I
d
dIIcfIITIpdIIIT
dIIIIpcITIR
?
?
(2)
In practice, it is nearly impossible to evaluate the income distribution
a priori for some group of taxpayers. This analysis suggests that a rea-
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sonable approach under such conditions is to set p(Id) slightly more
than t/f for any Id. This will force risk neutral or risk averse taxpayers to
declare their true incomes and enables the authority to improve its in-
formation about income distribution, and eventually to introduce an im-
proved auditing rule if it turns out to be unprofitable to audit taxpayers
who declare relatively high incomes. Of course, for some groups this
approach will be sufficiently unpromising, perhaps because of high
auditing costs, such that they should be exempt from the audit process
from the beginning. But this is a different issue.
3.2. A model with corrupt auditors
This section considers a model that takes into account the possibility
that a detected tax evader will bribe an auditor. Assume that there are
only two possible levels of income IL < IH, obtained with probabilities
1 – q and q, respectively. The low-income level is free of tax and the tax
on high income is T. Thus, taxpayers with true income IH may have an
incentive to report IL. If a taxpayer reports low income, the tax agency
may wish to conduct an audit. An audit costs c, and always reveals the
true income. The fine for under-reporting is F, and includes the original
tax liability. An auditor may be bribed, however, inducing him or her to
suppress the result of the audit, thus shielding a taxpayer who reports IL
instead of actual income IH from a fine for under-reporting.
The central authority sometimes checks auditors who confirm low in-
comes and penalises them if the review reveals that the inspector has
concealed tax evasion. (They are penalised for poor auditing, not for
accepting bribes, because of the difficulty of proving that a bribe was
accepted.) The probabilities p and pc of auditing by the inspector and
reviewing by the central tax authority, respectively, are themselves es-
tablished by the authority. The penalty for a poor audit is equivalent to a
monetary fine of value F~ , but it is assumed that only some share
δ ∈ (0,1) of this value represents revenue to the budget. The other
component of the fine borne by the auditor could be considered to be a
loss of future income due to discharge or a loss of reputation. (Note
that δ = 0 in the CW model, i.e. none of the fine becomes revenue to
the budget.) The cost of reviewing an audit is c~ . The central authority
aims to maximise net tax revenue, including taxes and its share of fines
minus all audit costs.
Our purpose is to find the optimal probabilities p and pc and then to
study comparative statics with respect to the size of the fine. We start
by discussing the bargaining over the amount of the bribe, b, in the
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case where a tax evader has been caught by an auditor. Bribing is prof-
itable for the taxpayer and the auditor if, respectively, b + pcF < F and
Fpb c ~> . Thus, bribing is possible if:
FppF cc ~)1( >− . (3)
If this inequality holds, let FppFb cc ~)1()1( γ−+−γ= , γ∈(0,1).
A taxpayer with high income will cheat if p(b + pcF) < T. If (3) does not
hold, then he or she will cheat, but not bribe, if pF < T.
Thus, we should consider the following cases.
a) F(1 – pc) > Fpc ~ , p(b + pcF) < T. Subsequently, taxpayers evade,
auditors take bribes, and the net tax revenue per taxpayer is:
( )ccFFqppR c −−δ+= )~)~(( .
b) F(1 – pc) < pcF, pF < T. In this case, taxpayers evade but there is
no bribery and:
( )cpqcqFpR c~)1( −−−= .
c.1) pF > T and F(1 – pc) < Fpc ~ , or
c.2) p(b + pcF) > T and F(1 – pc) > Fpc ~ . Under these conditions, there
is no tax evasion, and
R = qT – (1 – q)p(c + cpc~ ).
Denote FTp /=
?
, )~/( FFFpc +=
?
.
Proposi t ion 4. Under condition a), revenue R tends to the supremum
Ra when p tends to p
?
 and pc  tends to cp
?
. The supremum Rb under
condition b) and maximum Rc1 under c.1), moreover, correspond to the
same probabilities, Ra < Rb < Rc1. Under condition c.2), the optimal
probabilities are the same and maximal revenue is
)~(12 cpcpqTRR ccc
??
+−== ,
if
γ
γ−
<
c
cpc ~
1?
; (4)
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otherwise the optimal strategy is p = T/γF, pc = 0 and maximal revenue
is
F
q
cTqTRc γ
−
−=
1
2 .
Note 1. Under δ = 1 and the optimal probabilities, taxpayers pay the
same amount under conditions a), b) and c.1). However, the costs of in-
spection fall dramatically when the system passes from a) to b) or from
b) to c.1).
Note 2. Inequality (4) holds, in particular, if γ tends to 0, that is, where
taxpayers have bargaining power over the amount of the bribe. If γ tends
to 1 (that is, the inspectors have the power), then the optimal strategy is
not to review the inspectors but to set a higher probability of being
audited.
Thus, the net tax revenue under the optimal auditing strategy is


 


γ+
+−−=∗
F
c
FF
c
F
c
qqTR ,
~
~
min)1( .
Proceeding from this relationship, the comparative statics of R with re-
spect to the fines and the tax is quite clear: R increases in T and F, it
also increases in F~  while
1)/1(
~~
1
−γ
≥
−c
c
F
F
;
otherwise, R does not depend on F~ . (Of course, these comparative
statics hold only under a fixed tax base; see the next section for some
development of this point).
However, if p and pc are fixed then the comparative statics is more
complicated. Within each area a), b), c.1) and c.2), the revenue is
monotone in the fines and  the amount of the tax (in accordance with
common sense), but the transitions can bring surprises. Consider two
examples.
1. Let pp
?
< , cc pp ~= . Consider a small increase in the fine: F
′ =
F + dF. Then, the system shifts from area b) to area a), and the
revenue R suffers a sharp fall.
2. Let pp
?
= , cc pp ~= . Here, a small increase in the tax implies a shift
from area (c.1.) to area (b) and a sharp fall in R.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
AND APPLICATIONS TO THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
The results of section 3 enable us to propose the following approach to
improving the organisation of the tax inspectorate.
1. Proceeding from a priori information, taxpayers should be classified
into groups with the same distribution concerning random income.
For instance, for any enterprise, its account balance, together with
data from the banks where the taxpayer has accounts, would enable
an estimate of the maximum and minimum possible income from op-
erations on the legal market. A distribution of this interval can be
evaluated by using statistical data on the probabilities of cheating for
every kind of cost or exemption which the taxpayer declares.
2. For each sub-group of taxpayers with the same distribution of in-
come, an optimal auditing strategy should be calculated. According
to Section 3.1, this strategy is a modified cut-off rule )|( IIp d  de-
fined in 3.1.2. In particular, for a proportional tax rate t and fine
rate f, taxpayers who declared income Id less then I , should be
audited with probability t/(t + f).
3. The auditing strategy needs an adjustment to account for corrupt in-
spectors in order to avoid the bribery of inspectors by taxpayers.
Section 3.2 considers two possibilities for such a modification. One is
to review the results of audits with a certain degree of probability and
to penalise inspectors if the review reveals that the inspector has
concealed tax evasion. The other way is to increase the auditing
probability to such an extent that evasion is unprofitable, even if it is
possible to bribe an inspector. Which method is less expensive de-
pends on the relations between the parameters of the model. For in-
stance, if the fine for evasion is sufficiently high, or a typical bribe is
close to the maximum value acceptable for an evader, then the sec-
ond approach looks preferable. If the fine is relatively small, or the
bribe is close to the minimum acceptable for an inspector, then the
first approach is better.
4. It is necessary to adjust  the auditing strategy (the probabilities of
audit and review) for every change in the tax rate or the penalty for
evasion. Otherwise, an increase in these values may create new in-
centives for tax evasion or dishonest auditing and imply a decline in
tax revenue.
5. Last but not least, the previous results are valid for one short inter-
action between taxpayers and inspectors who match in random. It is
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necessary to avoid long-term relationships between taxpayers and
inspectors. Otherwise, each pair has a strong motivation for "co-
operative" behaviour which minimises tax revenue (see the standard
results on repeated games and their discussion by Tirole (1992).
Let us discuss some of these conclusions applied to the collection of
the profit tax in Russia. (In 1996, the share of the profit tax in the reve-
nue of the state budget was 18%.) According to Russian legislation (see
Íàëîãè, 1997), the profit tax rate is t = 0.35, and the fine rate is f = 2,
that is, the optimal probability of being audited is 15.047/7 ≈=p
?
.
Section 3.1 shows that the cut-off rule is optimal in this case. That is,
enterprises which declare income (profit) less than I  should be audited
with probability t/(t + f).
In order to choose the optimal value of threshold I , it is necessary to
divide enterprises into homogeneous groups and to evaluate the income
distribution within each one. Proceeding from the current situation of
mass tax evasion, we may expect that, at the first stage, it will be opti-
mal to audit almost all enterprises. According to Theorem, the maximum
possible income for a given group of enterprises relates to I  as follows:
cftcII 43,0)/(max ≈+>− .
The cost of auditing essentially depends on the method of evasion. Let
us roughly evaluate this cost. Evaluation by audit experts indicates that,
for a firm with a turnover of $30,000 and a profit of $15,000 per quarter,
a document audit usually lasts 2 – 3 days. However, the method of con-
verting profit to cash through a fictitious firm — an evasion technique
widely used in Russia — requires additional expenses in searching and
auditing such firms. Let us take one month as the upper value of the
total length of the audit. The salary of inspectors and tax policemen was
about $100 – 500 per month prior to August 1998, so let c = $300. We
can rewrite our evaluation as follows:
maxmax
max 43.0
I
c
I
II
>
−
,
thus it would seem beneficial to audit an enterprise if the declared profit
differs from the a priori upper value by more than 1%.
Currently in Russia there are about 20 firms per inspector, so under
specified p
?
 he should audit an average of three enterprises in one
quarter, which seems to be feasible.
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Note 3. In the present work, we do not consider the dynamics of tax-
payers’ behaviour under a changing audit strategy. A gradual decrease
in the share of taxpayers who evade taxes may be expected when
pIp d
?
>)(  for any Id < I. Thus, tax revenues will increase in the share of
audited enterprises if the current share of tax evaders with hidden in-
comes is sufficiently large. More precisely,
[ ]∫ >−−+π= ,0))(()|()( def dIcIIftIIIR ddd
where )|( dIIπ  is the density of income distribution for taxpayers who
declared Id. In order to increase the current revenue, it is reasonable to
evaluate )|( dIIπ  on the basis of conducted audits and to increase the
share of audited enterprises for such Id where R(Id) > 0, by beginning
with maximum values and continuing until the resources of the inspec-
torate are spent. (We may expect that the organisation of additional
audits will become more expensive and auditing should be discontinued
when the  value of R(Id) becomes 0.) Of course, we should not decrease
the probability of audit for other taxpayers with IId < .
The existing method of the analysis of the financial and production ac-
tivity of enterprises and organisations (Ìåòîäèêà ïðîâåäåíèÿ àíàëèçà
ôèíàíñîâî-õîçÿéñòâåííîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè ïðåäïðèÿòèé è îðãàíèçà-
öèé, 1997) worked out for tax inspectorates provides a good basis for
solving the problem of the selection of enterprises for audit. According
to this method, enterprises are ranked according to the difference be-
tween declared income (and some other parameters) and typical values
calculated from the past  activities of similar enterprises. It is proposed
to audit enterprises where this difference exceeds some threshold —
that is, similar to the deterministic cut-off rule (see Cowell, Gordon,
1995). However, we have shown above that such a rule is not effective.
Employment of the probabilistic cut-off rule makes the set of enterprises
which may be audited substantially wider and reduces the probability of
tax evasion.
In our discussion of the implementation problems, we should take into
account the possible irrelevance of our assumptions to the actual condi-
tions in some regions where corruption is organised, that is, where
bribes collected instead of taxes go to the top officials in the local ad-
ministrations. Under such conditions, an inspector who does not take
bribes will not get a job and the measures discussed above will not be
effective. Another important note: the tax legislation should be changed
before the reorganisation of tax inspection, because honest behaviour
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under the current level of taxes would lead the majority of enterprises
into bankruptcy. One more potentially dangerous factor, which is not re-
flected in our models, is the competition between regions for taxpayers,
leading to the existence of several "offshore zones" on the territory of
Russia.
Thus, much work must be done on the complex improvement of the
Russian tax system. We hope that our results and the approach devel-
oped in the present paper will be useful for the continuation of this
work.
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APPENDICES
A. Proof of Theorem
If (1) fails for some I  then )),(()( IpRpR ⋅<
?
 since the left hand side of
(1) is the difference between these values. Now, for any I1 < I2 <...< Ik
and ≥p
?
p1 > p2 >...> pk ≥ 0, consider the k-level strategy p(⋅) such that
pIp
?
=)(   if I < I1, p(I) =pl if Il ≤ I < Il+1, l = 2, ..., k.. The behaviour of a
taxpayer under such a strategy is as follows. For l = 1, ..., k – 1, II  de-
termines the income value, such that the expected income after taxes
and fines is the same whether a taxpayer declares Il or Il+1. That is,
tI p t f I I tI p t f I Il l l l l l l l+ + − = + − −+ + +( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 .
Then
Il
l l
l l
l l l l
l l
t
t f
I I
p p
p I p I
p p
=
−
−
+
−
−+
+
+
+ +
+
1
1
1 1
1
. (À.1)
Note that II II > , and II  is increasing in a monotone fashion in pl+1. If pl
is fixed and pl+1 tends to pl,  then II  tends to ∞.
Let 121 ... −<<< kIII , kI = def ∞. Thus, taxpayers with income I ∈ [0, I1]
declare their true income, for I ∈ [I1, 1I ], Id(I) = I1, and for ),,( 1 II III −∈
Id(I) = Il, l = 2, ..., k. We assume that, if several values of declared in-
come correspond to the same expected income after taxes and fines,
then a taxpayer declares the value closest to actual income.
If 1−≤ II II  for some l, then the taxpayer never declares Il. There exists an
auditing strategy, m < k, which implements the same behaviour from
taxpayers and yields the same revenue. (Consider an auditing strategy
which differs from the original only in that p(I) = pl–1 for Il ≤ I < Il+1.)
Let us prove by induction that any k-step auditing strategy is dominated
by some 1-step strategy with p1 = 0 (i.e., by a new cut-off rule).
Consider a 2-step strategy S(I1, I2, p1, p2). Then, 1I  is given by (A.1).
Let us determine a variation dp = (d1, d2 ) such that 1I  stays the same
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for any permissible strategy S(I1, I2, p1+xd1, p2+xd2). Then,
d d
I I
I I
1 2
1 2
1 1
=
−
−
;
since
.
ˆ
11
12
11
21
21
II
II
II
II
ppp
−
−
−
−
+=
?
Let p(x)=p + xdp, d2 = 1. The maximum permissible value of x corre-
sponds to p1(xmax) = p2(xmax) = p
?
, that is, to the random auditing rule.
Under the minimum value,
p2(xmin) = 0,   p1(xmin) = 
11
12
II
II
p
−
−
?
.
The net revenue linearly depends on x:
( ) ( )dR x
dx
I I
I I
t f I I c d t f I I c d
I
I
I
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) .=
−
−
+ − − + + − −∫ ∫
∞
1 2
1 1
1 2
1
1
1
ν ν (À.2)
If this value is non-negative then S(I1, I2, p1, p2) is worse than the ran-
dom auditing rule, otherwise this strategy is dominated by
)0,,,(
11
12
21
II
II
pIIS
−
−
?
.
For the last strategy, the net revenue is equal to the convex combina-
tion:
( ) ( ))0,()1()0,( 11 ISRISR λ−+λ  with λ = − −( )/( ).I I I I1 2 1 1 (À.3)
Thus, one of these cut-off rules is not worse than the original strategy.
Now, consider any k-step strategy, S(I1, ..., Ik, p1, ..., pk). If 1−≤ II II  for
some l, then we can argue by intuition. If pk > 0, then let us determine a
variation dp = (d1, ..., dk) such that the values 11 ...,, −kII  are the same
for any strategy S(I1, ..., Ik, p(x)), where p(x) = p + xdp.
It suffices to set dk = 1, and dl–1 = dlyl, where ),/()( 111 −−− −−= IIIII IIIIy
l = k, ..., 2. The supremum xmax of permissible x corresponds to
pl(xmax) = p
?
 for any l = 1, ..., k, and the minimum value is determined
by pk(xmin) = 0. The subsequent argument is the same as in the case
of k = 2.
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Finally, note that any non-increasing function p(⋅) may be approximated
by a k-level strategy with any degree of precision with respect to the
value of R, if k is large enough.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
By definition of )(IR ,
∫ ρ+ρ−=′ +
I
dIItIIR
ft
ct
,)()()( (Â.1)




+ρ=″
ρ
ρ′
+ ft
c
ItIR 1)()( . (Â.2)
The equation
′ +
= −
ρ
ρ
t f
c
(Â.3)
does not have solutions when dII ≤  and does not have more than one
solution in ],[ IIM
?
. If such root ′I  exists then 0)( ≤″ IR  when ′≤ II  and
one more root ″I  of this equation may exist in the interval (IM, ∞). Then
0)( ≥″ IR  when ″≤≤′ III  and 0)( ≤″ IR  when ″> II . If 0)( <′′ IR , then
one local maximum is situated in the interval ′≤ II . If 0)( >″′ IR , then
the second local maximum is reached when I → ∞ (because ∞→′ )(IR
when ∞→I ). If the second root does not exist, then the first maximum
is unique. In the case that 0)( ≥′′ IR , the only possible maximum
is ∞=I .
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